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HOW “INTUITION” EXPLODED
JAMES ANDOW
Abstract: Recent decades have seen a surge in interest in metaphilosophy. In
particular there has been an interest in philosophical methodology. Various ques-
tions have been asked about philosophical methods. Are our methods any good?
Can we improve upon them? Prior to such evaluative and ameliorative concerns,
however, is the matter of what methods philosophers actually use. Worryingly, our
understanding of philosophical methodology is impoverished in various respects.
This article considers one particular respect in which we seem to be missing an
important part of the picture. While it is a received wisdom that the word “intui-
tion” has exploded across analytic philosophy in recent decades, the article pre-
sents evidence that the explosion is apparent across a broad swathe of academia
(and perhaps beyond). It notes various implications for current methodological
debates about the role of intuitions in philosophy.
Keywords: analytic philosophy, descriptive methodology, intuitions, metaphilo-
sophy, methodology, philosophical methodology.
1. A Received Wisdom
Goldman gives voice to a received wisdom in philosophical methodology:
“As a historical matter, philosophers haven’t always described their meth-
odology in the language of intuitions. In fact, this seems to be a fairly
recent bit of usage. Jaakko Hintikka (1999) traces the philosophical use of
‘intuition’ to Chomsky’s description of linguistics’ methodology. In the
history of philosophy, and even in the early years of analytic philosophy,
the terminology is not to be found. . . . This is not to say that historical
philosophers and earlier 20th-century philosophers did not make [appeals
to intuition], they just didn’t use the term ‘intuition’ to describe them”
(Goldman 2007, 2). This wisdom is that, regardless of whether the
methods of analytic philosophy have changed in recent decades, the ter-
minology has. Philosophers use words like “intuition” a lot, and they only
started doing this recently.
The reason many accept this picture may owe much to Hintikka (1999),
but he was not the first to make such observations. Cohen says that the
sense of “intuition” as an immediate non-inferential judgement “began to
prevail in the later 1940s. It then became fairly common, at least in North
America, for intuitions to be explicitly invoked by philosophers” (1986,
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77). Indeed, intriguingly, the history of disquiet among philosophers over
“intuition,” and the frequency with which philosophers use it, seems to go
back even further. In 1946, a master’s student at the University of Shef-
field, Leslie Belton, wrote a dissertation entitled “The Meaning and Use of
the Term ‘Intuition’” (Belton 1946). Belton says in the introduction: “No
word in common use among philosophers is in more urgent need of an
accepted definition than the term ‘intuition,’ and no word bears such
diversity of meaning” (1946, 4). Nonetheless, although it may not involve
consensus on precise dates, received wisdom has it that use of the word
“intuition” has exploded in analytic philosophy.
If the received wisdom is correct, the following questions are prompted:
Why has this terminological shift has taken place? Is it a purely termino-
logical shift or is it perhaps symptomatic of a shift in philosophers’
methods? Before addressing such questions, however, we need to know
whether the received wisdom is correct. We need to know whether the
supposed phenomenon to be explained exists. It does. As we shall see
below, the proportion of philosophy articles indexed in JSTOR indulging
in intuition talk has grown from around 22 percent in the decade 1900–
1909 to around 54 percent in the decade 2000–2009. And so we want to
know why this has happened.
If we want to know what best explains the explosion in “intuition,”
then more empirical data will be helpful—that is, beyond the simple
finding that use of intuition talk has grown in philosophy. Certain facts
about the explosion may help us arbitrate between explanations. For
instance, information about when the explosion began and whether intui-
tion talk exploded elsewhere could be important. In what follows, I
present the results of an empirical study which shows that: (a) the explo-
sion in the use of “intuition” is far from confined to philosophy—in fact,
intuition talk has been on the rise across a broad swathe of academia; and
(b) nonetheless, intuition talk has grown at a greater rate within analytic
philosophy in particular.
Before I report the empirical findings, however, I want to do two things
by way of motivating a more careful empirical investigation into the
explosion of intuition talk. First, I want to quickly canvass the various
types of explanation of the explosion that have been suggested in the
philosophical literature. I note that the explosion they seek to explain
seems to be one that is confined to philosophy. Second, I report some
suggestive evidence that casts some doubt on this picture: evidence that
intuition talk has exploded in a number of other areas, suggesting that our
understanding of the explosion is impoverished.
2. Explaining the Explosion
The picture that Goldman (2007) paints is that intuition talk is on the rise
but that no great methodological change drives this rise. He thinks that
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philosophers have always used intuitions (it isn’t clear whether he thinks
the rate of use has been constant). This suggests a picture on which the
recent rise in intuition talk is mainly a linguistic phenomenon. Cappelen
offers a similar story, suggesting that one factor contributing to the explo-
sion in intuition talk is that philosophers have acquired “a kind of
intellectual/verbal virus (or tick) that started spreading about thirty to
forty years ago” (2012, 50), and that it is not motivated by any substantial
shift in philosophical commitments or methodology. Cappelen notes that
he has no satisfactory answer to how the “virus” was caught or why it was
so infectious. But he thinks it has been influential, and particularly dam-
aging in philosophical methodology. He thinks that intuitions play no
important part in philosophy, but that “the virus helped convince those
doing methodology that things called ‘intuitions’ play an important part
in philosophical arguments” (Cappelen 2012, 50).
Others, again, think the change in philosophers’ terminology is to be
explained in terms of a change in their methodology—that is, it is due to
an increased use of intuitions themselves. The clearest example of such a
view is that of Hintikka. He takes the explanandum to be as follows:
“Before the early 1960s, you could scarcely find any overt references [to
intuition]. . . . After the mid-1960s, you will find intuitions playing a
major role in the philosophical argumentation of virtually every article or
book” (Hintikka 1999, 5). Hintikka thinks that philosophers started using
intuitions in a big way in the wake of Chomsky’s influential theories in
linguistics. The idea is that Chomsky’s theories were so successful that
they were taken to “provide a methodological paradigm of what can be
done in those fields where the subject matter involves the tools of human
thought and cognition” (Hintikka 1999, 5), and philosophers’ increased
use of intuitions is an attempt to replicate that success in philosophy.
But Hintikka doesn’t think that philosophers typically recognise this
influence.
The question as to what explains philosophers’ increased use of intui-
tion talk is interesting in itself. However, it also seems that it has some
potential methodological consequences. Certain types of explanation
would generate novel worries about intuition-using methods. For
instance, Hintikka claims that “the linguistic parentage of contemporary
philosophers’ intuitionist methodology . . . constitutes a strong reason to
be wary of it” (1999, 5). Other explanations would draw attention to
other problems. Cappelen thinks one of the main reasons that philoso-
phers tend towards an intuitionist conception of their methods is the
prevalence of intuition talk in philosophy. He thinks, however, that this is
a big mistake, since the prevalence of intuition talk in philosophy is largely
the result of a “verbal virus” rather than anything to do with philosophers’
methods.
Let’s quickly consider some other possible factors that we might
think have contributed to the increased use of intuition talk (some via
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increased appeal to intuitions themselves). Three are gestured at by
Cappelen (2012): the emphasis on “what we would say” from either
ordinary language philosophy or late Wittgenstein; Moore’s emphasis
on the pre-theoretic; and Rawls’s use of “intuition.” Three more
deserve consideration. First, the so-called linguistic turn may have
played some role.1 Second, a particular approach in early twentieth-
century philosophy of mathematics and the language used in describing
it may have played a role. The approach in question is that of finding
formal definitions with which to replace informal and vague intuitive
notions.2 And, third, that the uses of “intuition” in various parts of
psychology, in the 1970s and 1980s, may have contributed to the explosion
perhaps having come to philosophy through Stich (e.g., 1990), among
others.3
As noted, all these suggestions seem to take the explanandum to be an
explosion that was confined to philosophy.4 However, the supposed
picture doesn’t fit well with some suggestive evidence from elsewhere.
3. Suggestive Evidence
In light of the various explanations offered by philosophers, it is interest-
ing to note that academics in some other fields have also explicitly noted
an increased use of intuition talk over recent decades.5 In relation to
economics, Frantz notes: “The increasing reliance on formal modeling
and mathematics in economics after World War 2 kept intuition in the
background of the profession. Yet, recently it has become almost
1 Thanks to Jonathan Tallant for this suggestion.
2 Thanks to Greg Currie for this suggestion. For an example of this sort of move, see
discussion of Church’s thesis. One description of Church’s thesis that brings out this theme
can be found in Shapiro 2006.
3 The particular uses I have in mind are those of Kahneman, Tversky, and colleagues (see
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Kahneman and
Tversky 1982; Thagard and Nisbett 1983; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). This usage may
have been influential especially in those parts of philosophy closest to cognitive science,
including experimental philosophy.
4 Of course, some of the factors appealed to would be capable of explaining
changes outside philosophy. Chomsky should be expected to have influenced linguistics.
The philosophy of mathematics may have influenced mathematics. Tversky, Kahneman,
and colleagues were working in psychology. Changes in these other fields, however,
are clearly not considered part of the explanandum by those offering the respective
explanations.
5 When presenting these results in a number of places, various audience members have
confirmed that they are aware of this trend in their fields. Among the more unexpected
include an anecdotal observation that the use of the word “intuition” has increased among
horse trainers—the suspicion being that this is a result of the increased respectability of
“natural horsemanship” in the past twenty years.
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commonplace for an economist to state during a presentation that, ‘The
intuition behind the model (and/or result) is’” (Frantz 2004, 135).6
Haidt and Kesebir (2007) look at the use of the word “intuition” in
psychology from 1985 to 2004. They find some evidence suggestive of
growth. Notably, they present their findings as contrasting considerably
with those of a similar previous study (Bastick 1982) that showed
extremely limited use of “intuition” in psychology (in 1979). Haidt and
Kesebir’s main concern is intuition, rather than “intuition,” but their data
speak to both. Haidt and Kesebir’s analysis categorises (non-incidental)
uses of “intuition” in research article titles into four groups. Two of these
groups increased as a proportion of the total number of articles published
per decade between the decades 1985–1994 and 1995–2004. Uses in one
category grew by 188 percent.7 Uses in a second category grew by 138
percent.8 The base rate, that is, growth of the total number of articles, was
49 percent. Two other uses grew at and below the base rate, respectively.9
Tallant (2013) conducted a survey of the use of “intuition” in physics
journals. His figures show that between 2001 and 2011 the proportion of
papers using the words “intuition,” “intuitive,” “intuitively,” “counter-
intuitive,” and “counter-intuitively” in five physics journals steadily
increased, from 7.44 percent to 9.25 percent.10 Further searches on my part
reveal that, in the same journals, the proportion rose steadily from 1.95
percent in the 1960s to 7.89 percent in the 2000s.11
And, finally, there is some evidence from outside the academy. First, a
brief search of Google’s NGram corpus (containing around 4 percent of
all books ever published) reveals a notable increase (about fourfold) in use
of such terms between 1800 and 2000 (see figure 1).12 The pattern also
6 Thanks to Jonathan Tallant for pointing me to this source. This locution is one novel
to me and, interestingly, implies that Frantz has observed some increase in methodological
use of intuitions. I think more detailed qualitative work would be valuable in comparing the
trends in usage across different disciplines.
7 These were labelled “personality facts” and concern a distinction between intuitive/
experiential and analytical/rational thinking styles. Haidt and Kesebir attribute the growth
of this category to the work of Epstein (citing Epstein 1990).
8 Haidt and Kesebir label this category “anthropocentric facts.” It seems to concern
intuitions about aesthetic matters. This growth use is claimed to be due to increased use in
social psychology.
9 These were “plain facts,” to do with things like maths problems, and “behavioural,” to
do with decision making and problem solving.
10 The five journals are the following: Physical Review Letters, Review of Modern Physics,
Physical Review A–E, and Physical Review Special Topics Energy Beams.
11 I used the same search engine as Tallant. This can be found at http://publish.aps.org/
search (including only papers written in English).
12 See Michel et al. 2011 for more on this resource. Simple search tool available at:
http://books.google.com/ngrams. This particular search was conducted on 19 May 2012.
This search conducted 2 August 2013 using python script, available at http://www
.culturomics.org/Resources/get-ngrams.
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remains if we restrict ourselves to English fiction writing. I searched for
“intuition” and “intuitive” in the period 1800 to 2000. In this period in
fiction the frequency of “intuition” and the frequency of “intuitive” each
rose from around 1.5 to 5 tokens per million words.13
Second, a brief search of the TIME corpus that contains all copies of
TIME magazine from 1923 to 2006 reveals a similar pattern.14 During the
period 1923–1929, the frequency of “intuition,” and so on, was 2.62
tokens per million words. During 2000–2006, the frequency was 8.4 per
million. The general pattern between 1923 and 2006 is one of increase,
although the pattern is not one of steady increase.
13 These are rough figures based upon Google’s NGram Viewer output graph. This
particular search was conducted on 19 May 2012.
14 The corpus was created by Mark Davis at Brigham Young University. The search
facility is available at http://corpus.byu.edu/time/. The search for these data was conducted
on 28 October 2013. The search terms were the following: “intuition,” “intuitions,” “intuit,”
“intuits,” “intuitive,” and “intuitively.” Thanks to Millar (2009) for drawing my attention to
this resource.
FIGURE 1. Intuition talk in Google’s NGram corpus.
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The pattern suggested by these various observations is not that the rise
in intuition talk in philosophy is an isolated phenomenon. Rather, the
pattern suggested is that intuition talk is on the rise rather more
generally—perhaps even across the board. And if this is so, the canvassed
suggestions (in section 2) as to what explains the explosion in philosophy
seem likely to explain at most part of the phenomenon. In any case, the
evidence just surveyed serves to demonstrate that our understanding of
the nature of the explosion in intuition talk in philosophy is impoverished.
It seems that if we want to understand why intuition talk exploded in
philosophy, we need to find out more about how the explosion in philoso-
phy relates to any more general explosion. In the rest of the article, I
present evidence that strongly suggests that the growth of intuition talk in
philosophy is part of more general phenomenon. This suggests that the
most important explanatory factors—which explain the explosion in
philosophy—are likely to be factors that are not specific to philosophy.
4. Study
A first step is to confirm whether intuition talk has indeed exploded in
philosophy and elsewhere; so we need data.
There is an unfortunate lack of resources to turn to in order to gain
such data. Corpora that allow for diachronic study of word frequencies in
English, more generally, over the twentieth century are scarce and very
small compared with corpora used for other purposes.15 This a problem
for diachronic studies looking at English usage in general, let alone for
studies that require looking particularly at academic writing and compar-
ing different disciplines.16 Consequently, the method used in the present
study has had to be a little less direct, and inventive.
4.1. Method
I searched for the terms “intuit,” “intuition,” “intuitive,” “intuitions,”
“counter-intuitive,” “intuitively,” and “counter-intuitively” in all journal
research articles published in English available through the JSTOR data-
base.17 Using JSTOR, it is possible to ascertain both the number of articles
15 See Millar 2009 for an extended discussion of the lack of appropriate resources. Millar
recommends the use of the TIME corpus for diachronic studies. However, this is of no use
for my purposes here.
16 See Groom 2005 for a study which uses corpora that allow for the comparison of two
disciplines—History and Literary Criticism—but not diachronic study.
17 This can be found at http://dfr.jstor.org. JSTOR coverage for the decade 2000–2009 is
not complete for all journals. However, since (i) we are working with proportions, and (ii) no
large changes in trends are observed relating to this decade, I think that it is safe to use the
data from this decade. The physical sciences are not well represented in JSTOR, so their
absence here ought not to be taken to indicate a lack of growth in the use of “intuition” in
the physical sciences.
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published in each discipline in each decade and the number of articles
mentioning one of the search terms, and thus to calculate the proportion
of articles published during each decade by disciplines that mention the
search terms.
There are limitations to the data which are worth noting to avoid
confusion. For instance, the search facility used doesn’t give us manage-
able data concerning actual word frequencies, and it doesn’t allow us to
easily distinguish between different ways of using the same words. Quali-
tative research looking at rather smaller samples of text would be neces-
sary to make such distinctions. We should also bear in mind that JSTOR
is not a perfect resource, in that not every journal is indexed. Nonetheless,
it does provide a fairly general coverage of academic publishing and a
search facility that gives useful information—a feature not shared by any
obvious alternatives. Other multidisciplinary indexing or search services
that I considered (for example, Pubget, Google Scholar, and Springer) do
not enable easy access to information that would allow one to track both
the number of articles indulging in intuition talk and the total number of
articles published by discipline in a given time period.
The headline finding is that I found that an increase in the proportion
of articles using at least one of these terms was apparent across the broad
swathe of academia indexed by JSTOR. Now for some more details.
4.2. Basic Results
The figures showing the rise in proportions are shown in table 1. The
figures for philosophy largely confirm the commonly assumed picture:
that intuition talk in philosophy has been on the rise in recent decades.
The increase certainly seems to have been greatest from the 1950s
onwards. Indeed, we might tentatively observe that prior to this there
seems to have been a period of relatively little change in the proportion of
philosophy articles engaging in intuition talk.
The explosion, however, is far from confined to philosophy. Philosophy
articles are generally more likely to indulge in intuition talk—no other
discipline really comes close until the 1980s—but the general pattern of
increased rates of indulgence in intuition talk exists to some degree across
most disciplines indexed. This can be clearly demonstrated since, even if
we take data relating to philosophy articles out of the analysis, there is a
significant effect of decade on the proportion of articles in a discipline
mentioning the search terms per decade.18 Indeed, every decade since the
1940s saw a highly significant increase in the proportion of articles in a
discipline mentioning the search terms compared with the previous
18 Using a repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser corrections,
F(1.53,59.46) = 115.03, p < .0005.
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TABLE 1. Indulgence in intuition talk by decade and discipline
Table Information: The first row gives the decade-by-decade proportions (in percentages) for
all disciplines, including those not exhibited. The rest of the disciplines are ranked in
decreasing order by the proportion of articles mentioning the terms for the 2000s. Dashes
indicate that no articles are indexed for a given discipline and decade. The searches for the
data in this data set were conducted on 4 September 2012.
Discipline 1900s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 2000s
All disciplines 2.6 3.6 4.2 5.2 6.2 8.3 10.5 13.1 14.6 16.3 18.3
Philosophy 21.7 29.6 34.5 33.5 4.2 32.7 34.9 44.1 47.5 50.5 53.6
Finance 7.2 5 7 6 12.4 10.1 16 18.7 25.8 36.7 47
Marketing & Advertising — — — 11.1 11.4 14.6 17.3 25.6 31.8 36.8 39.9
Business 7.1 6.4 6.2 6.5 10.1 13.4 16.3 20.1 25.7 32 39.3
Linguistics 3.9 5.1 4.3 5.1 5.9 5.7 15.2 22.8 24.6 32.4 39.2
Economics 6.7 6 6.1 7.1 9.9 13.2 14 16.5 21.6 27 34.5
British Studies 8.1 6.4 8.9 12 13.3 22.9 19.5 24.8 27.8 30.1 33.5
Slavic Studies — — 18.8 17 19.2 20.7 19.4 24.5 23.7 27.6 33.2
Management & Org. Behav. — — — — 8 18.1 21.1 19.8 23 29.2 32.9
Hist. of Science & Technology 8.8 10.9 15.9 13 12.7 17.2 21.7 30.4 31.1 33.4 32.5
Transportation Studies — — — — — — 13.4 18.4 21.7 26.6 32.2
Law 2 2.9 3.7 6.8 7.8 9.5 14.7 19.1 24.8 27.2 30.8
Religion 5 8.3 7.2 9.4 10.5 13.5 16.3 21.7 24 25.3 28.3
Sociology 8 6.9 7.3 8.8 9.5 11.7 14.7 20.2 21.5 25.2 27.9
Latin American Studies — 7.8 5 7.2 8.5 11 15 20.5 21.7 24.6 27.9
Political Science 5 5.8 7.8 12.6 13.2 16.2 17.4 18.7 20.8 22 27
Statistics 3.3 2.5 3.6 5.1 8.6 13.2 14.5 15.5 17.2 22 26.6
African Studies 3.4 4.7 4.7 7.1 5.5 6.1 9.9 15.9 19 22.5 26.2
Public Policy & Admin. — 2.9 2.7 4.3 6.4 10 13.7 19.3 22.1 24.2 25.9
History 3.8 4.8 5.9 7.5 9.3 12.3 16.1 20 21 24.2 25.7
Development Studies — — — — — — 12.4 8.6 18.4 21.7 25.3
American Studies 3.6 4.6 5.8 7.2 7.5 11.2 14.3 16.4 17.5 22 24.4
Anthropology 2.7 2.9 2.9 4.6 4.9 7.2 10.9 15.8 17.3 22.1 24
Music 4.9 6.5 7.8 6.2 6.1 7.5 7.5 10 13.2 18.2 23.8
Folklore 2.5 2.1 2.7 4.4 2.8 6 6.8 11.6 16.3 17.5 23.2
Jewish Studies 6.7 7.1 5.5 9.1 13.3 12.4 12.7 16.3 20.8 24.3 22.8
Psychology 16.3 13.1 7.9 9.8 12.1 10.8 13.4 12.3 16.8 20.4 22.5
Film Studies — — — — 5 9.1 14.6 21.7 23.8 24.6 22.2
Asian Studies 3.7 3.5 3.8 6.8 7.3 14.1 14.3 14.8 16.4 19.3 22
Middle East Studies 2.1 3.7 4 5 5.4 7.7 11.4 15.2 14.9 18.2 21.6
Architecture & Architec. Hist. 0 0 8.7 8.3 6.1 10 10 10.1 15.3 18.4 20.4
Art & Art History 2 3 5.8 3.8 7.3 10.2 10.8 12.1 13.9 16.6 19.5
American Indian Studies — 9.1 0 2.7 3.5 3.8 8.2 9.2 9.9 14.9 19.5
Performing Arts — — — — 0 11.1 15.2 16.7 12.5 16.7 19.4
Language & Literature 5.5 5.5 4.6 6 7.6 8.9 12.2 14.2 15.4 16.2 18
Education 4.5 4.1 3.5 4 4.3 5.7 9.4 11.9 13.2 15.5 17.7
Feminist & Women’s Studies — — — — — — — 6.6 8.8 12.6 17
Bibliography — — 2.6 8.9 9 9.1 9.9 11.9 14 17.2 16.8
Geography 1.8 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.9 5.3 7.3 11 11 12.7 16.6
Classical Studies 3.3 3.7 3.8 4.7 6.1 7.6 9.4 10.4 11.7 15.4 16.6
Population Studies — — — 0 7.2 9.3 8.1 9.2 11.8 14.1 16.3
Mathematics 2.2 3.5 5 6.5 7.4 8.7 8.6 9.3 10.8 12.7 15.5
African American Studies — 0 5.1 6.7 8.6 8.7 8.9 12.6 12.5 12.4 13.1
Archaeology 2.4 3 3.1 3.9 4.1 4.8 5.7 8 8.5 9.9 11.6
Ecology & Evolutionary Biol. 1.1 1.5 1.4 2.1 1.9 3.2 5 8.1 8.5 9.7 11.2
Irish Studies 2.1 3.9 4.2 6.2 5.9 8 8.5 9.7 10.9 9 10.8
Health Policy 0 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.9 2.7 6.2 8.6 10 8.6 9
Aquatic Science — 1.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 4.2 5.6 7 8 8.4 8.6
Biological Science 1.2 1.8 2 2.6 2.7 4.4 6.7 7.9 7.8 7.6 8
General Science 2.1 2.8 2.7 3.6 4.2 7 8.7 9 7.7 7 7.6
Library Science 5.4 5 5 3.6 2.5 4.3 5.8 6 6.9 7.3 7.4
Developmental & Cell Biology — — — — — 2.5 9.3 16.9 19.5 14.2 6.7
Astronomy 1.2 0.8 0.6 1 0.7 0.6 1.4 3.9 5.6 7.6 6.4
Zoology 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.3 2.1 3.6 5.5 6.1 6.1
Paleontology 1.6 0.6 1 1.9 1.8 3.7 4 4.5 5.4 6.2 5.9
Health Science 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.8 4.1 5.1 5.9
Botany & Plant Science 0.5 0.7 1 1.4 1.7 3 6 6.5 5.5 5 5.2
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decade.19 This suggests clearly that the explosion in use of “intuition” and
related words is not confined to philosophy.
4.3. Comparing Philosophy and Non-philosophy
Having confirmed that there has been a very general increase in the rate of
indulgence in intuition talk, we can now ask whether the explosion in
intuition talk in philosophy has nonetheless been greater than in other
disciplines.
We can use binary logistic regression analysis to see if we can predict
whether an article mentions one of the search terms using the variables
(i) decade, (ii) whether an article was published in philosophy or elsewhere,
and (iii) the interaction of (i) and (ii).20 If the interaction term were signi-
ficant, this could be a good sign that the rate of growth in philosophy was
different from that in other disciplines. Table 2 shows the various regres-
sion coefficients and Wald statistics. All are highly significant (at .01 levels).
Although the interaction is significant, we should note that the regres-
sion coefficient is small and, anyway, negative. This means that the model
predicts that the extent to which the proportion of philosophy papers
engaging in intuition talk exceeds the proportion of other papers that
engage in such talk falls over time. To get a better idea of the nature of this
interaction, we can consider some figures called odds ratios.21 We can ask
19 Details from post hoc tests using Bonferroni correction (asterisks indicate highly
significant increase on previous decade): 1900s, m = 3.85, SD = .49; 1910s, m = 4.12, SD = .44
(p = 1); 1920s, m = 4.65, SD = .47 (p = 1); 1930s, m = 5.63, SD = .50 (p = .009)*; 1940s, m =
6.46, SD = .61 (p = .16); 1950s, m = 8.58, SD = .76 (p < .0005)*; 1960s, m = 10.68, SD = .78
(p < .0005)*; 1970s, m = 13.35, SD = .99 (p < .0005)*; 1980s, m = 15.40, SD = 1.13 (p <
.0005)*; 1990s, m = 17.97, SD = 1.39 (p < .0005)*; 2000s, m = 20.55, SD = 1.67 (p < .0005)*.
20 Decade was coded 0 to 10. Place of publication was coded philosophy .5, non-
philosophy −.5. A test of this model compared with a model containing only a constant (the
intercept) was statistically significant, χ2(3, 5280019) = 178227.617, p < 0.0005. The model
correctly classified 2.9 percent of those papers that mentioned the search terms and 99.6
percent of those that did not.
21 Because the interaction term is in the model we cannot read odds ratios straightfor-
wardly from the regression coefficients.
TABLE 2. Model 1
Model B Wald χ2 p
Philosophy 2.233 9347.372 < 0.0005
Decade by philosophy −.062 450.758 < 0.0005
Decade .165 12817.243 < 0.0005
Constant −2.324 40517.458 < 0.0005
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what the model predicts about the odds that a philosophy paper engages
in intuition talk for each decade surveyed.22 We can also ask what the
model predicts about the odds that any other paper does the same. And we
can then compare these odds by asking in what ratio they stand to each
other—I call this the expected odds ratio.
The expected odds ratios are displayed in table 3. The expected odds
ratios steadily decrease over time, that is, they show the extent to which (i)
the odds that a philosophy paper engages in intuition talk exceed (ii) the
odds that a non-philosophy paper will do the same, steadily decreasing
over the surveyed period.
We can also calculate what we might call the observed odds ratios
directly from the data. This reveals a similar story (see table 4): there is a
general downward trend. The observed odds ratios do suggest, however,
that if we want to properly understand the interaction it may be worth
treating the periods 1900–1950 and 1950–2009 separately. The reason for
this is that since the 1950s the odds that a paper published in philosophy
engages in intuition talk have been (roughly) a steady five times the odds
that a paper outside philosophy would do the same. This suggests that we
should perhaps be treating the two periods (before and after 1950) as
exhibiting different trends. That the trends are different for the first and
second halves of the twentieth century is also suggested by the finding that
only since the 1940s have non-philosophical disciplines consistently seen a
highly significant decade-on-decade rise in the proportion of articles men-
tioning the search terms (see table 1).
22 The model: Yˆ = −2.324 + 2.233 * Phil − .062 * Phil * Decade + .165 * Decade.
TABLE 3. Expected odds ratios
Decade Odds ratio
95% confidence intervals
Upper Lower
1900 9.33 9.45 9.21
1910 8.77 8.87 8.67
1920 8.24 8.33 8.15
1930 7.74 7.82 7.66
1940 7.28 7.35 7.21
1950 6.84 6.90 6.79
1960 6.43 6.48 6.38
1970 6.04 6.08 6.01
1980 5.68 5.71 5.65
1990 5.34 5.37 5.31
2000 5.02 5.05 4.99
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Pursuing this thought, looking just at the period after 1950, we find
binary logistic regression giving the model in table 5.23 In this model, the
interaction is still less important: the interaction is significant only at the
.05 level and not at the .01 level; the coefficient for the interaction is,
although positive, rather smaller. This suggests the same picture: that the
extent to which philosophy papers are more likely than other papers to
engage in intuition talk has not undergone huge growth since the 1950s.
One way to illustrate this is to plot the data. In figure 2, we can see the
proportions of articles that engage in intuition talk and the proportion
of articles in all other disciplines from the 1950s to the 2000s. We can
compare the line of fit for philosophy (the upper line) with a regression line
for the proportions in non-philosophical disciplines (the lower line).24
23 A test of this model compared with a model containing only a constant (the intercept)
was statistically significant χ2(3, 4291567) = 78033.860, p < 0.0005. The model correctly clas-
sified 3.1 percent of those papers that mentioned the search terms and 99.5 percent of those
that did not.
24 Philosophy line: Yˆ = .443 * x − 831.14. Non-philosophy regression line: adj. r-squared
.242, Yˆ = .24 * x − 459.18.
TABLE 4. Observed odds ratios
Decade Odds ratio
95% Confidence intervals
Upper Lower
1900 11.39 12.83 10.11
1910 12.34 13.62 11.18
1920 13.10 14.38 11.94
1930 9.93 10.76 9.17
1940 8.45 9.10 7.85
1950 5.70 6.03 5.39
1960 4.75 4.99 4.53
1970 5.50 5.70 5.30
1980 5.56 5.74 5.38
1990 5.49 5.66 5.32
2000 5.43 5.58 5.28
TABLE 5. Model 2
Model Wald χ2 p
Philosophy 1.606 1613.772 < 0.0005
Decade by philosophy .010 4.595 .032
Decade .166 4798.034 < 0.0005
Constant −2.327 13551.247 < 0.0005
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It is clear that the rates of increase are in the same ballpark (even
though the actual proportions are generally much higher in philosophy).
Interestingly, although it may look as if the rate of increase in philosophy
is marginally greater, we should note that fixed increases, for example, of
10 percent, on the y-axis do not represent the same absolute rate of growth
because such an increase, of 10 percent on the y-axis, represents percent-
age change in proportion. To illustrate, the increase from approximately
40 percent to 50 percent in philosophy between the 1970s and 2000s for
instance doesn’t indicate as large a rate of increase as an increase over the
same period from 10 percent to 20 percent—the former representing a 25
percent increase in proportion and the latter a 100 percent increase.
Looking instead at the relative decade-on-decade increase in proportion
gives a more accurate picture. In this second graph (figure 3), which plots
increase in proportion relative to previous decade by decade, the lower line
is a line of fit for the proportion of philosophy articles mentioning the
FIGURE 2. Proportion of articles mentioning “intuition,” by decade.
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terms in each decade from the 1950s onwards.25 The upper line is a
regression line for the proportion of non-philosophy articles mentioning
the terms in each decade from the 1950s onwards.26
The emerging picture is that the rate of increase in intuition talk in
non-philosophical disciplines has been rather higher than in philosophy,
but that it has been decreasing over the period whereas the rate of increase
in philosophy has remained relatively constant.
4.4. Comparing Analytic and Other Philosophy
One remaining hypothesis is that the explosion in analytic philosophy has
nonetheless been rather larger than in non-philosophical disciplines. The
numbers for philosophy from JSTOR given above lump analytic and
25 Yˆ = .096 * x − 180.694
26 Adj. r-squared .115, Yˆ = −.66 * x + 1329.483
FIGURE 3. Relative decade-on-decade increase in percentage.
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continental philosophy together. One reason this failure to differentiate is
relevant is that within continental articles discussion of figures such as
Kant, Bergson, Husserl, and so on, seems likely to have been common
right from the beginning. The word “intuition” plays a large role in
discussion of the work of these figures (in ways that are somewhat
removed from those common in contemporary analytic philosophy).
One way to try to probe this further is to compare the proportions of
articles engaging in intuition talk within publications that we can identify
as “staunchly analytic” to the proportions for articles published else-
where. Table 6 records the proportion of articles engaging in intuition talk
in Philosophical Review and Mind and compares them to the figures for the
rest of philosophy.27 (Philosophical Review and Mind were ranked first and
fourth in quality among general philosophy journals in recent years in an
important ranking by analytic philosophers.28 The second and third places
were taken by Noûs and the Journal of Philosophy. I don’t include the data
for the Journal of Philosophy here, as a name change makes tracking the
proportions difficult. I have left Noûs out because it is a fairly recent
journal, having published its first issue in 1967.)29
There is a clear difference in the scale of the explosion between Philo-
sophical Review and Mind and the rest of philosophy. Figure 4 shows
clearly the trend of staunchly analytic publications to have a greater rate
of growth in the proportion of articles using “intuition” and similar terms
from the 1950s onwards.
Table 7 allows us to compare Mind and Philosophical Review to all
other journals (in all disciplines). We can see that the difference is quite
stark. The odds that a Mind or Philosophical Review paper published in
the period 2000–2009 engages in intuition talk are roughly twelve times the
odds that a paper published elsewhere will do so! (And, again, we can see
27 The searches for the data in table 6 were conducted on 4 September 2012.
28 The report for 2009 can be found at http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/03/
the-highest-quality-general-philosophy-journals-in-english.html. The report for 2012 can
be found at http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2012/04/the-top-20-general-philosophy
-journals.html.
29 Nonetheless, in that short time the proportion of articles mentioning the relevant terms
in Noûs has risen, demonstrating a spectacular increase, from 46.7 percent (1967–1976) to
83.9 percent (2000s).
TABLE 6. Proportions per decade in philosophy journals
Journal(s) 1900s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 2000s
Other 17.3 25.3 34.3 32.1 33.2 33.4 35.6 44.4 47.3 50 53.3
Mind 32.5 37.1 30.6 31.2 34.5 25.9 27.4 36.2 49.6 66.5 67.2
Phil. Rev. 29.5 43.7 40.6 44.7 42.7 31.2 33.5 53.6 63.3 73.3 86
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FIGURE 4. Proportion of philosophy articles mentioning search terms.
TABLE 7. Odds Ratios: Mind and Phil. Review vs. everywhere else
Decade Odds ratio
95% confidence intervals
Upper Lower
1900s 17.73 21.34 14.73
1910s 18.42 21.74 15.61
1920s 12.56 14.84 10.63
1930s 11.48 13.42 9.82
1940s 9.91 11.69 8.40
1950s 4.33 5.08 3.69
1960s 3.55 4.11 3.06
1970s 4.54 5.22 3.95
1980s 6.65 7.81 5.67
1990s 11.11 13.51 9.14
2000s 11.95 14.96 9.55
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a pattern of increasing ratios since the middle of the twentieth century.) To
sum up this section, it does seem that, even if philosophy generally has not
seen a markedly larger explosion, Mind and Philosophical Review, and by
inference analytic philosophy, have. In the 2000s, 86 percent of articles in
Philosophical Review engaged in intuition talk, which suggests that some
discipline-specific explanations will have some role to play in explaining
the explosion in intuition. It also seems that any analytic-philosophy-
specific contribution to the recent explosion has played an important role
only since 1950.
5. Conclusion
The lessons that we should take from this study are fairly modest. Further
empirical work will be required in order to make any concrete claims
about what the causes of the explosion in intuition talk have been, both
in philosophy and elsewhere. Nonetheless, I think that there are three
important lessons to be learned. The basic shape of the three lessons is
as follows. We now have a better understanding of the phenomenon to
be explained—the explanandum. What we have learned about the
explanandum allows us to place restrictions on what a satisfactory expla-
nation of the explosion would look like—upon the explanans. Let me say
something about the lessons to be learned before moving on to note some
limitations of the present study and some promising avenues for future
research.
Lesson number one is that the received wisdom is largely borne out by
this study. Analytic philosophy does seem to have seen a large surge in
intuition talk since the 1950s, and this surge has been greater than the
increases observed both in philosophy more generally and in the rest of
academia. All the same, we should note that it doesn’t seem to be true that,
for instance, as Goldman claims, “in the early years of analytic philoso-
phy, the terminology is not to be found.”30 Indeed, in both Mind and
Philosophical Review intuition talk is common throughout the period sur-
veyed. So, if we want to explain the explosion in usage within philosophy
in recent decades, then explanations that aim to explain some phenom-
enon specific to analytic philosophy—for example, many of the sugges-
tions surveyed earlier—will doubtless have to play some minor role, but a
minor role is the only role they will have to play. (It is, of course, possible
that the explosion of intuition talk in philosophy is a phenomenon com-
pletely distinct from that observed in other areas of academia, for all the
30 Goldman’s claim is that intuition talk is not to be found in the early years of analytic
philosophy used to describe the practice of appealing to intuitions. My data don’t show this to
be false. A more detailed qualitative survey would be needed to confirm whether early uses
describe intuition use.
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evidence presented here. The best explanation of the evidence, however,
is not one that treats the appearance of a general pattern merely as a
coincidence.)
Lesson number two is that we can start to refine the pool of analytic-
philosophy-specific factors that are plausible candidates for this minor
role. Only factors whose contribution would be made in the latter half of
the twentieth century seem to be plausible explanations for the greater rate
of increase in intuition talk in analytic philosophy. This is due to the fact
that the greater rate of increase is clearly apparent only from the 1970s
onwards (see figure 4). Looking at the suggestions I canvassed earlier, it
does seem that we can make some tentative refinements of this variety.
Some of the suggested factors do still look plausible: any influence of
Chomsky, Rawls, intuition talk in 1970s and 80s psychology, and (to a
lesser extent) Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy might
plausibly have been during this period. On the other hand, some of the
other suggestions look less plausible; any influence of Moore or early
twentieth-century philosophy of mathematics seems unlikely to account
for the upturn in the rate of intuition talk that begins later in the twentieth
century.
Lesson number three, perhaps the most important, is that we should
not underestimate the extent to which the explosion in philosophy (even
analytic philosophy) is part of a wider phenomenon. The findings of the
study indicate that there has been a rather large growth in intuition talk
across a broad swathe of academia. It seems likely, therefore, that appeal
to some more generally relevant factors will feature centrally in any com-
plete explanation of why philosophers engage in quite as much intuition
talk as they do. Perhaps Cappelen is right to attribute much of the explo-
sion in philosophy to some sort of verbal virus (the twist is that everyone
had the virus). Of course, the question remains as to why intuition talk has
been increasing more generally. It seems unlikely that any more general
trend is due to any great shifts in methodology. One reason I say this is
that the methods employed across the different disciplines are very varied.
Another is the suggestive data (in section 3) showing increases in usage
outside the academy, which suggest that the upturn may not be restricted
to academia at all. However, beyond suggesting that the general terminol-
ogy shift is likely not due to a general methodological shift, I have no
particular explanation to advance.
This said, it is worth thinking about what explanations of such a
phenomenon might be like. And so I offer two suggestions, to which I
have no particular commitment, simply in the spirit of illustrating the type
of factors to which one might appeal to explain a more general increase in
intuition talk.
First, there might be a connection with a number of studies indi-
cating that levels of various relevant psychologically interesting
characteristics have increased in recent generations, for example, positive
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self-conceptions, extraversion, and narcissism.31 There are a number of
such studies (Twenge 2001; Twenge and Campbell 2010; Twenge and
Foster 2008 and 2010; Twenge et al. 2008a and 2008b).32 This could be
relevant, since a society in which individuals come to have higher percep-
tions of their own worth and become more willing to share information
about themselves might well be expected to be one in which people become
more likely to talk about their personal mental states and to report their
instinctive reactions—that is, one in which talking about their intuitions
come to be more common. I think that it is likely factors such as these, for
example, facts about changing psychological dispositions or the social
acceptability of certain types of discourse (perhaps within academic con-
texts), are the sorts of factors we should be thinking about.
Second, one explanatory factor may be the increased fragmentation of
the research community.33 The thought might be that academic writings
are targeted at a much more homogeneous audience than they once were,
because people address their work to a very narrow specific corner of
academia. This being so, the expectation that you will be able to appeal to
intuition about x and have your audience share your intuitive response to
x would be much higher. This could explain why academia as a whole saw
a large increase in intuition talk.
Indeed, all sorts of things could be relevant. A third and final sugges-
tion draws on the idea that the concept of intuition has been gendered
historically, at least at times. It is possible that the increase in intuition talk
in the academy has something to do with the change in the proportion of
female academics. The idea might be that this led to a change in climate
rather than that women use intuition talk more often. As with the other
suggestions, more data are needed to properly assess this suggestion’s
merits. (The changing proportion of female authors in JSTOR has been
examined; see West et al. 2013. The data are not, however, rich enough to
provide much insight for our purposes.) As I say, these three suggestions
are intended simply as an illustration of the type of factors that could
generate such a shift.34
So the present study makes some important contributions to our
understanding of the explosion in intuition talk and helps us start to
31 Thanks to Ben McGorrigan for this suggestion. Levels of narcissism are measured
using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory developed by Raskin and colleagues (Raskin and
Hall 1979 and 1981; Raskin and Terry 1988).
32 But note that some meta-analyses question some of these findings (Donnellan,
Trzesniewski, and Robins 2009; Trzesniewski, Donnellan, and Robins 2008).
33 This was suggested by an audience member in Derby.
34 Once we have a hypothesis about what might drive any more general increase—about
the nature of the “virus”—it would also be worth asking whether there is any reason to think
philosophers would be particularly susceptible to picking up the language as compared with
writers in other disciplines (or perhaps other disciplines showing sharp rises over the same
period, e.g., finance, marketing, and business).
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explain why the explosion occurred. And this is not without conse-
quence for philosophy and philosophical methodology. For one
instance, it is not uncommon to premise the urgency of the methodo-
logical investigation of intuitions on linguistic facts (like Hintikka 1999).
The thought might be “it seems almost every philosophy paper written
in the past ten years makes explicit appeal to intuition,” and one might
proceed to worry about the changing methods or assumptions under-
girding this linguistic change. The findings of the present study show,
however, that generating methodological worries about intuitions in this
way is problematic. Philosophers do use the word “intuition” a lot
nowadays, but the evidence suggests that this is not due to any great
shift in methods, so there is no particular reason to start worrying and
asking, What is this new method? Is it reliable? And so on. (Of course,
none of this is to say that we shouldn’t be worried about philosophers’
use of intuitions, just that, if we are going to be worried, we should be
worried for better reasons.)
The present study only goes so far. Further research, particularly
qualitative research, will be essential in order to get a clearer picture.
Gathering and analysing such data will be a big project requiring time
and resources. It will, however, help us address a number of questions
that the present study has a limited ability to address. I’ll finish by noting
a few of these questions. Answering these questions will not only help us
pinpoint the explanation for the explosion but also provide an invalu-
able source of insight into the methods of philosophers and other academ-
ics, including to what extent philosophers’ methods are distinctive to
philosophy.
(1) How has the actual frequency of words such as “intuition” and “intui-
tively” changed in academia over the surveyed period? We can’t make any
direct inferences about word frequency from the present study, since we
have no information about article length or the number of “intuition”
tokens in each article. An increase in the proportion of articles using
intuition talk—such as I observe—could theoretically be explained by an
increase in the length of academic articles (if, indeed, any such increase in
length has occurred).35 While it is possible to obtain data concerning word
frequencies from the same JSTOR Data for Research facility used for the
present study, to organise this data into a form we could use to address
this issue here would have been too laborious (for a single researcher with
limited time), as it is provided in files that contain the word-frequency
35 Thanks to Tom Stafford for making this point clear. But note that it is implausible that
the length of research articles has increased to an extent that would provide a complete
explanation. In the 1900s, the proportion of articles using intuition talk across all disciplines
was 2.6 percent and in the 2000s, 18.3 percent. Article length would have to have increased
by around 700 percent in order to account for this pattern.
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data for a single article each. It would, however, be an interesting avenue
for future research.
(2) Has any particular type of use of intuition talk seen a general increase
across the academy? The present study is unable to distinguish different
types of intuition talk. It is important to ask to what extent the various
disciplines are using intuition talk in similar ways. Other disciplines some-
times use words like “intuition” in some pretty unfamiliar ways (at least to
philosophers: see Abernathy and Hamm 1995; Frantz 2004; Haidt and
Kesebir 2007; Tallant 2013), and it is unclear from the present study
whether the general explosion in intuition talk has been an increase in only
some of these uses.
(3) We tentatively observed that the two halves of the twentieth century
exhibited different trends—at least in philosophy. Is this perhaps due to
different types of intuition talk? This is a very interesting question. One
naïve thought is that the initial decrease in the proportion of philosophy
articles engaging in intuition talk may be due to a decline in a particular
way of using such language, perhaps related to a decline in Kant scholar-
ship. Another similar thought is that the same pattern is due to the rise of
ordinary language philosophy via its pushing out of pure rationalist intui-
tion talk.36 Again further investigation is necessary as without data it is
unclear what this pattern is telling us.
(4) How does the usage of intuition talk within academia compare with
intuition talk outside the academy? This is an important question. There is
some evidence that speaks to this issue. For example, there is evidence
suggesting that growth in intuition talk may be a quite general phenom-
enon that occurred in fiction writing too. For another example, there is
evidence that suggests there may be important differences between aca-
demic usage and usage in ordinary English, for instance, Cappelen (2012)
notes that use of intuition talk to modify contents was very rare outside
philosophy. However, again, further research is needed to obtain a clear
picture. I say this because Cappelen’s data seem to include only one source
from outside philosophy that is an academic text. This suggests to me that
the difference Cappelen notes may be due simply to a difference between
academic and non-academic English. And there is some evidence that
supports my suspicion. I conducted a quick search of the corpus of British
Academic Spoken English (BASE).37 This contains thirty-five token uses
of intuition talk, of which only two are clearly not content related, sug-
gesting that other academic disciplines use intuition talk in similar ways to
philosophers.
36 Thanks to Stephen Barker for this thought.
37 The BASE corpus was developed at the Universities of Warwick and Reading under
the directorship of Hilary Nesi (Warwick) and Paul Thompson (Reading). Corpus develop-
ment was assisted by funding from the Universities of Warwick and Reading, BALEAP,
EURALEX, the British Academy, and the Arts and Humanities Research Council.
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